Three main approaches to the legal consequences of transboundary environmental harm have been mooted by authors and by a succession of Special Rapporteurs to the International Law Commission (ILC): liability ex delicto, under which states would be responsible for transboundary harm if they failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm; liability sine delicto stricto sensu, under which states would be responsible to pay compensation for transboundary harm even in the absence of fault or negligence; and an equitable balancing of interests approach, often referred to as liability sine delicto lato sensu, under which transboundary harm may be permitted as long as it is reasonable and equitable. Three projects of the ILC are relevant here: the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (the Articles on State Responsibility); the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 2001 (the Articles on Transboundary Harm, formally titled International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law); and the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, 2006 (the Principles on Allocation of Loss)—all cited under International Instruments. This is a difficult and controversial topic, for both doctrinal and policy reasons. Transboundary environmental harm is generally not caused by state activity per se, but rather by private actors. The activities that give rise to it are often considered beneficial, and prohibiting them is rarely feasible. It may be difficult to identify an injured state, particularly if the environmental damage is felt in global commons areas. Proving causation can be immensely challenging. States have widely disparate capacities to ensure a high standard of environmental protection. Finally, determining what environmental damage ought to be compensated, and how the amount of compensation is to be calculated, raises complicated economic, political, and philosophical questions.
A ton of information here, I’m not really sure how long it is going to take me to get through it all:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/admiralty
This site is a mess, but it has good stuff:
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/codes.html
This has pretty detailed accounts of what belongs to whom, according to international custom between 1100-1800.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2713&context=wmlr
Introduction
Three main approaches to the legal consequences of transboundary environmental harm have been mooted by authors and by a succession of Special Rapporteurs to the International Law Commission (ILC): liability ex delicto, under which states would be responsible for transboundary harm if they failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm; liability sine delicto stricto sensu, under which states would be responsible to pay compensation for transboundary harm even in the absence of fault or negligence; and an equitable balancing of interests approach, often referred to as liability sine delicto lato sensu, under which transboundary harm may be permitted as long as it is reasonable and equitable. Three projects of the ILC are relevant here: the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (the Articles on State Responsibility); the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 2001 (the Articles on Transboundary Harm, formally titled International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law); and the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, 2006 (the Principles on Allocation of Loss)—all cited under International Instruments. This is a difficult and controversial topic, for both doctrinal and policy reasons. Transboundary environmental harm is generally not caused by state activity per se, but rather by private actors. The activities that give rise to it are often considered beneficial, and prohibiting them is rarely feasible. It may be difficult to identify an injured state, particularly if the environmental damage is felt in global commons areas. Proving causation can be immensely challenging. States have widely disparate capacities to ensure a high standard of environmental protection. Finally, determining what environmental damage ought to be compensated, and how the amount of compensation is to be calculated, raises complicated economic, political, and philosophical questions.
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_sr2450.pdf